Philosophy of Religion--Back in Action

So, To Will One Thing is back, once again appearing in connection with PHIL/RS 322 at Marymount Manhattan, Spring 2010. Welcome...looking forward to some good conversations both here and in the classroom this semester.

It's my general practice to begin the semester with Plato's _Euthyphro_, perhaps the first example of philosophy of religion, as we have come to understand it, in the Western tradition. What do we learn about philosophy of religion from careful study of the text? Here are some thoughts:

Let's think about the differences between Socrates and Euthyphro. Socrates is interested in conceptual clarity and, we might say, intellectual essences (what _is_ piety?). Euthyphro is not terribly interested in the pursuit of these goals. Instead, he adheres (rather self-righteously) to a set of pre-reflective beliefs that link his ideals (piety), actions (prosecuting his father), and divinity (the gods).

We might say that reflection vs. pre-reflection (or non-reflection) marks the boundary between philosophy and religion in this text. Philosophy draws religious belief into a reflective space and scrutinizes it, elucidating, confirming, or disconfirming religious claims in the light of questioning. Maybe that's one way of defining the work of the philosopher of religion.

But the story is not quite that simple, as we realize when we encounter the famous “Euthyphro problem” in the middle of the dialogue. Of course, one might be tempted to solve the dilemma by arguing through one of its "horns." Maybe there is an overarching standard for piety and goodness to which even divinity is subservient. Or maybe the things that are good _are_ only good because God/the gods like them. Divinity decides, and that's the way it is. And perhaps that's fine, as some later monotheists would argue, because God can _only_ like the Good--that's just the way God is.

It's possible that trying to sort out the dilemma, however, misunderstands what Socrates is up to here. Does Socrates want Euthyphro--or perhaps someone a bit more intrepid--to come along and solve the problem? Unlikely. Instead, the question Socrates poses--is something holy because it is beloved by the gods, or do the gods love it because it is holy--is meant to stop us in our tracks when it comes to Euthyphro's religious claims. Here it's interesting to note that Socrates himself puts a temporary stop to our "reflection" in this moment of philosophical wonder and surprise. So maybe the non- or pre-reflective moment is part of philosophy too...not just religion.

In any event, Euthyphro retreats from it and then muddles through the rest of the dialogue, never really changing his core convictions: at the end, he's just as ready to prosecute his father as he was at the beginning. But we who read this moment as genuine philosophers of religion register the surprise and perplexity, sit with it, and then press on, in pursuit of broader truths. Philosophy of religion is not _just_ about solving problems and/or policing religious claims--it takes such problems and claims as the experiential occasion for intellectual transformation.

Or so Socrates seems to be telling us!

On a totally different note, please post summaries of next week's readings below, as outlined in my recent email. And of course feel free to comment on the _Euthyphro_, if you'd like.