Philosophy of Religion -- Week 3

A common claim among the so-called “New Atheists” is the suggestion that we give religion an intellectual pass, compared to the level of scrutiny that we give scientific, moral, or political claims. So, particularly when people have divergent religious views, we often say (according to this “New Atheist” reading), “Ok, that’s fine. You believe what you wish. I won’t push you on it, because it’s a religious belief.”

But on the other side, we also seem to subject religious views, perhaps, to very _stringent_ standards, compared to those we deploy the majority of the time, in everyday experience. So, for example, to the claim, “I believe in God and the after-life,” the often-heard response is “Give me proof, or else you’re not allowed to say/believe that.” Of course, we can and should immediately ask: what kind of proof would be satisfactory in this case? A rational proof, like those found in geometry? Exhibiting God to the skeptic?

The fact is, many of our beliefs, beliefs that we most often give the benefit of the doubt—or, more technically, would affirm as justified for those who hold them—seem to require no such proof.

Here’s an example, an old favorite of mine: “My wife loves me.” Here’s a possible response: “I’m not convinced that you’re right just on the face of it. So I demand a proof to ascertain whether your claim is justified or not.” What would be the right response to this challenge? Maybe I should give some reasons/warrants for my claim: “She married me.” “She says so.” “She makes me my favorite cake.” Etc. But how many warrants should I produce to justify my belief?

The problem, of course, is that there are many such claims for which there is no assigned number or magnitude of warrant(s) that would seal the deal—and a logical, well-constructed proof won’t necessary do the job either. And yet, despite this inscrutability, under given conditions (that the claimant does in fact have a wife, is not insane, and a reasonable collection of others), we will affirm that the person making this claim is in fact justified in making it—and even that he is justified in making it with significant conviction. And not just out of politeness: you would likely affirm it yourself, in other, non-fraught situations. “Yes,” you might very well say later on, feeling completely comfortable doing so, in responding to someone who asks, “his wife loves him.” And not just out of intellectual laziness: a fairly vigorous skeptic in this case might search for some disconfirming information (e.g., the wife has been cheating) and finding none, he would likely at least tolerate the belief, or, again, affirm that it is in fact justified.

Assuming that this example is solid enough (which is certainly open to question), why might we be prevented from giving this degree of credence to religious beliefs (as opposed to subjecting them the standards of scientific/geometrical proof and certainty)? Maybe both positions are potentially true: we are too tolerant of religion—i.e., we often excuse it from scrutiny—but also, if/when we do scrutinize it, we often demand too much of it, compared to other beliefs.

The trick here, of course, is whether the comparison with other, “normal” beliefs holds up, or whether it breaks down because of that little bit of folk-y philosophical wisdom: the bigger the claim, the better the proof that’s necessary. But scrutinizing that idea is for another day…except to say it’s _really_ important to the guy in Queens whether his wife loves him!