So, To Will One Thing is back, once again appearing in connection with PHIL/RS 322 at Marymount Manhattan, Spring 2010. Welcome...looking forward to some good conversations both here and in the classroom this semester.
It's my general practice to begin the semester with Plato's _Euthyphro_, perhaps the first example of philosophy of religion, as we have come to understand it, in the Western tradition. What do we learn about philosophy of religion from careful study of the text? Here are some thoughts:
Let's think about the differences between Socrates and Euthyphro. Socrates is interested in conceptual clarity and, we might say, intellectual essences (what _is_ piety?). Euthyphro is not terribly interested in the pursuit of these goals. Instead, he adheres (rather self-righteously) to a set of pre-reflective beliefs that link his ideals (piety), actions (prosecuting his father), and divinity (the gods).
We might say that reflection vs. pre-reflection (or non-reflection) marks the boundary between philosophy and religion in this text. Philosophy draws religious belief into a reflective space and scrutinizes it, elucidating, confirming, or disconfirming religious claims in the light of questioning. Maybe that's one way of defining the work of the philosopher of religion.
But the story is not quite that simple, as we realize when we encounter the famous “Euthyphro problem” in the middle of the dialogue. Of course, one might be tempted to solve the dilemma by arguing through one of its "horns." Maybe there is an overarching standard for piety and goodness to which even divinity is subservient. Or maybe the things that are good _are_ only good because God/the gods like them. Divinity decides, and that's the way it is. And perhaps that's fine, as some later monotheists would argue, because God can _only_ like the Good--that's just the way God is.
It's possible that trying to sort out the dilemma, however, misunderstands what Socrates is up to here. Does Socrates want Euthyphro--or perhaps someone a bit more intrepid--to come along and solve the problem? Unlikely. Instead, the question Socrates poses--is something holy because it is beloved by the gods, or do the gods love it because it is holy--is meant to stop us in our tracks when it comes to Euthyphro's religious claims. Here it's interesting to note that Socrates himself puts a temporary stop to our "reflection" in this moment of philosophical wonder and surprise. So maybe the non- or pre-reflective moment is part of philosophy too...not just religion.
In any event, Euthyphro retreats from it and then muddles through the rest of the dialogue, never really changing his core convictions: at the end, he's just as ready to prosecute his father as he was at the beginning. But we who read this moment as genuine philosophers of religion register the surprise and perplexity, sit with it, and then press on, in pursuit of broader truths. Philosophy of religion is not _just_ about solving problems and/or policing religious claims--it takes such problems and claims as the experiential occasion for intellectual transformation.
Or so Socrates seems to be telling us!
On a totally different note, please post summaries of next week's readings below, as outlined in my recent email. And of course feel free to comment on the _Euthyphro_, if you'd like.
"It's possible that trying to sort out the dilemma, however, misunderstands what Socrates is up to here. Does Socrates want Euthyphro--or perhaps someone a bit more intrepid--to come along and solve the problem? Unlikely"
ReplyDeleteThis is probably the most important thing I took from Plato's "Euthyphro" because it really gets at the essence of the philosophy of religion as we discussed in class ("Ti esti"). I think people sometimes assume that by not arriving at actual answers to questions that they have failed in their intellectual pursuits but that is not the case and that's what Socrates reminds us here. Some people may view this passage as unfinished or fruitless even, especially considering the ending but what it does is it teaches us that more importantly than anything we need to be ASKING these important questions regardless. Especially regarding religion, which may never yield logically sound results but that doesn't mean we should just not bother inquiring altogether. I can't be the only one that's heard "but all you guys do is ask questions in circles - you never get anywhere!" ahh yes but Socrates shows us here that maybe it's not about destination.. it's about the journey!
"Nirvana Is Ultimate Reality" tries to define the word Nirvana as it relates to Buddhism. Jayatilleke gives the etymology of the word as meaning literally, "blowing out" or "extinction". This has been interpreted to mean the annihilation of the self. However, Jayatilleke argues that this contradicts how the Buddha saw it. Jayatilleke counters that, if this were true, then there could not be those who reach Nirvana while still being in this world to some extent; an empirical impossibility since the Buddha was an example of such an individual. Rather, he argues that Nirvana is meant to be a cleansing of some kind, comparing the mind to gold ore- impure until it is cleansed into gold. He concludes by musing as to what the psycho-social self becomes in death after achieving Nirvana. Going to the texts, he understands it not to be annhialation but the becoming of complete detachment, in a sense becoming everything. "Consciousness, without distinguishing mark, infinite and shining everywhere-here the material elements do not penetrate... but here it is that the conditioned consciousness ceases to be." He further describes our inability as non-Nirvana'd individuals to understand Nirvana as a blind man unable to understand color, a particularly elegant metaphor I feel for such a feeling and one difficult to argue with. It is for this reason, he suggests, that the Buddha never describes Nirvana but merely prescribes the methods by which one can reach it.
ReplyDeleteI would like to conclude by quoting another interpretation of the etymology of Nirvana from my favorite spiritual guide, The Tao of Pooh. In the first chapter, in a brief discussion of Buddhism, Hoff actually translates Nirvana as something akin to "no wind", i.e. "a state of nothingness". The difference here from Jayatilleke's translation is significant, since one is a noun whereas the other is a predicate, i.e. "to blow". Discuss!
Avicenna was a Muslim philosopher, scientist, and physician who held the beliefs that God is the Ultimate Reality, and all other things derive from him. He sets out through a series of arguments in “God’s Nature and Knowledge” to prove his theory. Avicenna claims that there is a necessary being and a contingent being, the necessary being equating to his idea of “God.” He explains that a contingent being must have a reason to come into being, an external factor giving it reason to be, or not to be. Therefore, the contingent being is derived from the necessary being, who has no reason for being, making it ultimately necessary.
ReplyDeleteFurthermore, Avicenna then argues that the necessary being cannot be a part of a duality. He explains that a necessary being that is part of a dualism would need to possess a distinguishable quality. He says that quality could be either accidental or essential. To be accidental, he claims there would need to be a reason for cause. If the accidental quality is in one part, and not the other, then one is deemed a necessary being and the other is not. He then argues that if the quality is essentiality, then the essential quality would need to be different in the two parts, creating a “compound,” which is causal, therefore neither parts can be necessary. If one has an essential quality and the other does not, the part without any essentiality is the necessary being.
Avicenna elaborates his perspective through a series of ideas arguing that God has no cause, demonstration that God has no cause, proof that God’s “quiddity” (or “whatness”) is not the same as His Identity, proof that God is not an accident, proof that God cannot be part necessary and part contingent, demonstration that He has no material, receptive, formal, or final cause, and finally, proof that God has, is, and knows of all knowledge.
Ramanuja believed God to be "Brahman" which we understand that to mean Supreme Person. Now "Brahman" is usually referred to whatever has qualities of greatness and unparalleled greatness. Ramanuja states that God is resistant to anything corrupt , and whose will is ultimately fulfilled. Ramanuja says he(Supreme Brahman or Lord) is the one who is known throughout the Vedas(scriptures of India) and the Upanisads( a revered portion of the Vedas). Ramanuja also mentions that the Vedas constitutes the worship of him; furthermore, Brahman grants, the fruit of the nature such as dharma(religious duty), artha(success), kama(pleasure) and moksa( Liberation from samsara.
ReplyDeleteRamanuja goes on to tell us that "Supreme Brahman" has a vast supply of auspicious qualities. Ramanuja states the first six are as follows: knowledge, untiring strength, sovereignty, immutability, creative power, and splendor. Ramanuja explains to us that " Supreme Brahman" is very lucid in character when it comes to the non-intelligent things such as Pradhana(material nature) and from all intelligent beings whether in a state of bondage or release.
Finally Ramanju states, when the Supreme Brahman is please by faithfulness and faithful worship, he frees one from the influence of Ignorance which is in the form of karma. He also allows them to attain bliss of matchless excellence, and lastly, one is not turned back to samsara(the cycle of death and rebirth).
-Warren Robbins-
DISCLAIMER: I'd be lying if I said I understood this completely. I have done my best to summarize all that I managed to grasp.
ReplyDeleteHick is (clearly) making an argument for religious pluralism. He draws mainly from Kant's ideas concerning the separation of the phenomenal world from the nuomenal world, which is to say the world as we can humanly perceive from the world that we cannot possibly perceive, respectively. He considers "God" to be a nuomenal concept, as we can not directly experience him or her. Also on the nuomenal list would be love. He explains that, according to Kant, God is "postulated" as opposed to experienced.
This is as much as I understood. My apologies for its severe brevity.
In ,"God's Nature and Knowledge,” Avicenna, writes at length about a Necessary Being and the qualities that it must possess. Avicenna was a Muslim philosopher from the late 10th century so to him Allah, “is Ultimate Reality, and everything else comes from Him” (93). Avicenna begins by trying to prove that there is a Necessary Being, something that exists necessarily (not unlike Plato’s idea of the Forms). It is difficult to discern exactly why Avicenna thinks that it must exist in the first place, but it is clear that this necessary being cannot be contingent since this would lead to an infinite regress. Next Avicenna explains why God must be One. Simply put, the Necessary Being can only be One because it would otherwise lead to breaking the law of identity and contradict itself in some way.
ReplyDeleteThe next part, Avicenna, explains how God is without cause of any kind. He is non-physical, so he has no material cause (He is beyond “time, space, direction, and being in one place to the exclusion of all other” (96-97)-again not unlike Plato’s world of the Forms).. He has no active cause because he is the Necessary Being and has no “reason” for being. He is a being of perfect actuality so he cannot change, therefore he came into being as is (he did not receive any attributes from his essence, since he was fully formed and this would imply some sort of imperfection). Beyond this he is perfectly self-sufficient, “Pure Benevolence and True Perfection,” (97).
The next section focuses on what God knows. Avicenna asserts that since, “His Essence is not absent from Himself; it follows from all this that He knows Himself” (98). Since he knows Himself, He knows what he has created. That being said, he knows all things that have being. Since he is not above change, “He knows things in a manner unchanging” (99), implying that He knows all of time, past and present, and He has always known these things.
This essay was extremely difficult for me to follow. I found most of the arguments to be either circular or unfounded, and generally confusing. I hope that the summary was not too off-base.
Oh Euthyphro! It feels like an eternity since we began the course with this dialogue, but I was recently introduced to it again while writing my final paper. Paul Copan (who I think may be slightly delusional) attempts to tackle this problem in how it relates to God and morality. The question posed was as such: Does God decide that things are good arbitrarily or does he consult some other source and then deem things good? Copan's explanation is that God, as the perfect, omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omniscient being that he is, does not dub things as "good" arbitrarily nor does he consult another source; he consults himself. I personally think this is a cop-out. Thoughts?
ReplyDeleteGabby Gabby, I agree with you when saying that this is a cop-out. It does not answer how He deems good and how he distributes it. On what basis does he then judge that something is Good or that something evil has to happen?
ReplyDelete