To Will One Thing: Religion Considered

Images of Vedic Gods

2011-09-28T10:57:00.005-04:00

Vayu

Ushas

Surya

Agni

Indra

RS 120-Religions of Asia

2011-09-02T12:37:00.005-04:00

RS 120 – Introduction to the Religions of Asia
Marymount Manhattan College
MW 2:30-3:50
MAN 201

Instructor

Bradley Herling, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor of Religious Studies
Email: bherling@mmm.edu // Ph: 212-517-0618
Office Hours: MW, 10:30-11:30, W, 1:00-2:30, or by appointment.

Course Description

This course offers an introduction to the religious worldviews of Asia, with an emphasis on the traditions of India, China, and Japan. In particular, we will closely examine the foundational scriptures, beliefs, and practices of Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism. Active course participants will gain literacy in the grounding concepts, history, and varieties of these traditions. In addition, we will reflect on how to examine them: what does theory in religious studies reveal to us about the religions of Asia? Building on both content and theory, we will take steps towards empathetic engagement with these worldviews. What do the texts, practices, and ideas of these religious traditions mean to their adherents? What impact do they have on the cultures of which they are part? And what do they mean to us, as students of religion and culture, who come at them from the outside?

This is a course in the academic study of religion: we will approach the subject matter self-consciously, analytically, and reflectively, just as you would in a course on history, literature, sociology, etc. We aim to describe, compare, and interpret religious phenomena, on our way towards a better understanding of them. This will require that you set aside your own views and background—at least at the beginning—to allow the data to shine through. That said, the course is not designed to make you either more religious or less religious. Rather, for everyone, believers and non-believers alike, religious literacy is a necessary feature of global citizenship. And studying religion in a theoretically sophisticated manner provides a unique perspective on the fundamental questions that all human beings face.

Overall, this course will 1) provide you with broad literacy in the predominant religious worldviews of Asia; 2) exercise your ability to interpret difficult and challenging subject matter (e.g., sacred texts, religious sites, etc.); 3) engage in acts of empathetic imagination, to see what it would be like to see the world as others do. This course satisfies the Disciplinary Studies component of General Education requirements in the Philosophy, Psychology, and Religious Studies area. It will therefore encourage you to 1) identify, describe, and explain key terms, concepts, and distinctions in religious studies; 2) reconstruct and explain various arguments concerning theories of human nature, knowledge, and/or value; and 3) critically evaluate these arguments and construct your own responses.

Course Schedule

9/7 Opening Rituals
Studying Religion: Why?

Hinduism

9/12 History and Sacred Texts
Reading: ER, 10-25, 41-51
9/14 Vedic Fire Ritual: Analysis
View: Materials under “Hinduism—Vedic Fire Ritual” on towill1thing.blogspot.com
Reading: BG, 55-59 (“Emile Durkheim”), excerpts from the Vedas (handout)
9/19 Ethics and Philosophy
Reading: ER, 61-67, 93-109
9/21 Aspects of the Divine and Sacred Persons
Reading: ER, 27-39, 53-59
9/26 Reluctant Fundamentalist panel discussion in Peruggi Room
Navaratri: 9/28-10/5
9/28 Puja: Analysis
View: Materials under “Hinduism—Puja/Darshan” on towill1thing.blogspot.com
Reading: BG, 50-53 (“Rudolf Otto”)
10/3 Sacred Times and Places
Holi, Ganges: Analysis
Reading: ER, 69-71; BG, 86-90 (“Mircea Eliade”)
View: Materials under “Hinduism—Sacred Times and Places” on towill1thing.blogspot.com
10/5 Hinduism Test
10/7 Paper #1 Due
10/10 No class: Columbus Day

Buddhism

10/12 History and Sacred Texts
Reading: ER, 112-131, 143-151
10/17 Ethics and Philosophy
Reading: ER, 163-169, 193-201
10/19 Meditation and Mindfulness
View: Materials under “Buddhism—Meditation and Mindfulness” on towill1thing.blogspot.com
Reading: BG, 53-55 (“William James”) and 95-99 (“Paul Tillich”)
10/24 Aspects of the Divine and Sacred Persons
Reading: ER, 133-141, 153-161
10/26 Monks and Buddhas
View: Materials under “Buddhism—Monks and Buddhas” on towill1thing.blogspot.com
Reading: BG, 59-63 (“Max Weber”) and 74-78 (“Religion as illusion” and “Karl Marx”)
Monthly Siddhartha Buddha Day (Tibet)
10/31 Sacred Times and Spaces
Reading: ER, 171-191
11/2 No class: Advisement Day (Juniors/Seniors)
11/4 Paper #2 Due
11/7 Rain Retreat and Ordination
View: Materials under “Buddhism—Rain Retreat and Ordination” on towill1thing.blogspot.com
Reading: BG, 63-67 (“Victor Turner”)
11/9 Buddhism Test

Chinese Traditions: Taoism and Confucianism

11/14 Debating Theory
Reading: BG, 90-94 (“Ninian Smart”) and 99-101 (“W.C. Smith”)
11/16 Origins and Historical Development
Reading: ER, 214-227, 316-333
11/21 Sacred Texts
Reading: ER, 241-249, 228-229, 343-351

Thanksgiving Break

11/28 Aspects of the Divine
Reading: ER, 231-237, 335-341
View: Materials under “Chinese Religions—Aspects of the Divine” on towill1thing.blogspot.com
11/30 Sacred Persons
Reading: ER, 251-259, 353-361
View: Materials under “Chinese Religions—Sacred Persons” on towill1thing.blogspot.com
12/5 Ethical Principles
Reading: ER, 261-269, 363-371
12/7 Society and Religion
Reading: ER, 305-313, 407-415
View: Materials under “Chinese Religions—Society and Religion” on towill1thing.blogspot.com
12/12 Death and the Afterlife
Reading: ER, 293-301, 395-405
View: Materials under “Chinese Religions—Death and the Afterlife” on towill1thing.blogspot.com
12/14 Sacred Space
Reading: ER, 271-277, 373-381
View: Materials under “Chinese Religions—Sacred Space” on towill1thing.blogspot.com
12/16 Paper #3 Due
12/19 Sacred Time
Reading: ER, 281-289, 383-391
View: Materials under “Chinese Religions—Sacred Time” on towill1thing.blogspot.com
12/20 Chinese Traditions Test

Chinese Religions--Sacred Time

2011-09-02T10:45:00.004-04:00

Chinese Religions--Sacred Space

2011-09-02T09:53:00.003-04:00

Chinese Religions--Death and the Afterlife

2011-08-31T14:26:00.003-04:00

Chinese Religions--Society and Religion

2011-08-31T13:59:00.003-04:00

Also see links to the Tao Painting Center and their blog.

Chinese Religions--Sacred Persons

2011-08-31T12:33:00.003-04:00

A report on the legacy of Confucius.

Chinese Religions--Aspects of the Divine

2011-08-29T10:13:00.003-04:00

Buddhism--Ordination and Rain Retreat

2011-08-23T14:28:00.007-04:00

Buddhism--Monks and Buddhas

2011-08-22T10:24:00.006-04:00

Buddhism--Meditation and Mindfulness

2011-08-20T10:33:00.004-04:00

Hinduism--Holi, Ganges

2011-08-15T12:04:00.004-04:00

Investigate the Ganges in Queens.

BBC reporter given Holi demonstration.

Watch the full episode. See more Religion & Ethics NewsWeekly.

Hinduism--Puja/Darshan

2011-08-14T14:17:00.007-04:00

Check out a virtual Shiva puja site.

04 Variations on a Reinterpretation of Lord Śiva by Eidetic Seeing

Hinduism -- Vedic Fire Ritual

2011-08-06T10:54:00.009-04:00

Philosophy of Religion -- God Is Not Great

2010-12-10T13:08:00.000-05:00

One of the jobs that we have as students of philosophy is on occasion to wade into wider cultural discourse and debates, and see what we can add, clarify, or correct. Background in the big, traditional issues in philosophy of religion puts us in a particularly good position to evaluate the claims of the so-called "New Atheist" movement, which has been promulgated most famously by Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, and Christopher Hitchens. In honor (if that's the right phrase) of the announcement about his failing health, I have selected Christopher Hitchens' _God Is Not Great_ for our scrutiny.

Of course this is a popular work, not a work of technical philosophy. But there are philosophical arguments here--and propositions that purport to be true--even if we sometimes have to see through Hitchens' rhetorical flair to discern them. So, here's the question: What are some of these arguments? Are they strong? Do they work? Which ones do, and which ones don't? For an informed student of philosophy of religion, is there anything new here? Does this book--and "New Atheism" in general--deserve the attention it has received?

Philosophy of Religion -- Somewhere in the Middle

2010-10-25T22:28:00.000-04:00

We have spent the last few weeks thinking about proofs for the existence of God, ranging from the design proof, which is based on evidence derived from our experience of the world (and analogical reasoning), to the cosmological proof, which is based on more general characteristics of the world we find ourselves in, to the ontological proof, which supposedly relies on a priori concepts and extends to the existence of a being outside of the understanding.

These proofs have suffered a beating, but I would like to know: what's positive and/or instructive about these proofs? What do we learn from examining them? Ok, one answer is that it's impossible to prove the existence of God by rational demonstrations...but I wonder if there's anything else, besides this negative truth, that arises out of them.

Philosophy of Religion -- Week 3

2010-09-25T15:52:00.000-04:00

A common claim among the so-called “New Atheists” is the suggestion that we give religion an intellectual pass, compared to the level of scrutiny that we give scientific, moral, or political claims. So, particularly when people have divergent religious views, we often say (according to this “New Atheist” reading), “Ok, that’s fine. You believe what you wish. I won’t push you on it, because it’s a religious belief.”

But on the other side, we also seem to subject religious views, perhaps, to very _stringent_ standards, compared to those we deploy the majority of the time, in everyday experience. So, for example, to the claim, “I believe in God and the after-life,” the often-heard response is “Give me proof, or else you’re not allowed to say/believe that.” Of course, we can and should immediately ask: what kind of proof would be satisfactory in this case? A rational proof, like those found in geometry? Exhibiting God to the skeptic?

The fact is, many of our beliefs, beliefs that we most often give the benefit of the doubt—or, more technically, would affirm as justified for those who hold them—seem to require no such proof.

Here’s an example, an old favorite of mine: “My wife loves me.” Here’s a possible response: “I’m not convinced that you’re right just on the face of it. So I demand a proof to ascertain whether your claim is justified or not.” What would be the right response to this challenge? Maybe I should give some reasons/warrants for my claim: “She married me.” “She says so.” “She makes me my favorite cake.” Etc. But how many warrants should I produce to justify my belief?

The problem, of course, is that there are many such claims for which there is no assigned number or magnitude of warrant(s) that would seal the deal—and a logical, well-constructed proof won’t necessary do the job either. And yet, despite this inscrutability, under given conditions (that the claimant does in fact have a wife, is not insane, and a reasonable collection of others), we will affirm that the person making this claim is in fact justified in making it—and even that he is justified in making it with significant conviction. And not just out of politeness: you would likely affirm it yourself, in other, non-fraught situations. “Yes,” you might very well say later on, feeling completely comfortable doing so, in responding to someone who asks, “his wife loves him.” And not just out of intellectual laziness: a fairly vigorous skeptic in this case might search for some disconfirming information (e.g., the wife has been cheating) and finding none, he would likely at least tolerate the belief, or, again, affirm that it is in fact justified.

Assuming that this example is solid enough (which is certainly open to question), why might we be prevented from giving this degree of credence to religious beliefs (as opposed to subjecting them the standards of scientific/geometrical proof and certainty)? Maybe both positions are potentially true: we are too tolerant of religion—i.e., we often excuse it from scrutiny—but also, if/when we do scrutinize it, we often demand too much of it, compared to other beliefs.

The trick here, of course, is whether the comparison with other, “normal” beliefs holds up, or whether it breaks down because of that little bit of folk-y philosophical wisdom: the bigger the claim, the better the proof that’s necessary. But scrutinizing that idea is for another day…except to say it’s _really_ important to the guy in Queens whether his wife loves him!

Philosophy of Religion -- Week 2

2010-09-20T21:53:00.000-04:00

The diversity of religious worldviews presents us with a genuine, “real world” challenge: how do we adjudicate the many divergent, often mutually exclusive claims that people from different religious traditions make? As a political and/or ethical stance, we might be prone to tolerance of difference. Surely we can all get along, right? As long as everyone respects each other’s right to worship and practice as he or she will, everything should be fine…

But this stance does by-pass some rather glaring differences between religious traditions. If one is committed to monotheism, that seems to deny the truth of polytheism, and vice versa. If someone thinks that Jesus is the only way to salvation, then other teachings must be mistaken. And so on. It seems that someone, in these debates, must always be wrong.

Or maybe not. Philosophers of religion have posited a range of theories to account for religious difference, ranging from the exclusivist, who does in fact defend the practice of claiming that one religion is right and all the others wrong, to the relativist, who suggests that all religious worldviews are in fact different, and all equally true. And there’s of course a range of positions in between, which we’ll discuss and explore.

There’s also the suggestion that all religious claims are unfounded. All religion is illusory, so trying to theorize about the differences between various religious positions is kind of like trying to figure out who’s right in an insane asylum. Who’s right: the crazy guy who thinks that wombats are about to take over the world, and the other guy who thinks its gecko lizards. Gosh, how do we deal with this diversity of belief? Um, recognize that both of these dudes are crazy and call it a day.

But we have to recognize that making the argument that all religion is deluded is just as ambitious as claiming that all religions point to the same truth, or just one religion is the true one. All these options are on the table…but perhaps the right approach is more nuanced.

For example: claims about “ultimate reality” diverge significantly (i.e., the ultimate truth is Allah, Jesus, Tao, Brahman, nirvana, etc.), but maybe the real issue is conflicts about where authoritative knowledge comes from. Last week we noticed a number of different possibilities, and I’ll simply catalog them here. Does authoritative knowledge come from:

Feeling?
Scriptures?
Testimony of others?
Direct observation?
Direct intuition?
Rational argument?

Or somewhere else?

Philosophy of Religion--Back in Action

2010-09-11T21:42:00.004-04:00

So, To Will One Thing is back, once again appearing in connection with PHIL/RS 322 at Marymount Manhattan, Spring 2010. Welcome...looking forward to some good conversations both here and in the classroom this semester.

It's my general practice to begin the semester with Plato's _Euthyphro_, perhaps the first example of philosophy of religion, as we have come to understand it, in the Western tradition. What do we learn about philosophy of religion from careful study of the text? Here are some thoughts:

Let's think about the differences between Socrates and Euthyphro. Socrates is interested in conceptual clarity and, we might say, intellectual essences (what _is_ piety?). Euthyphro is not terribly interested in the pursuit of these goals. Instead, he adheres (rather self-righteously) to a set of pre-reflective beliefs that link his ideals (piety), actions (prosecuting his father), and divinity (the gods).

We might say that reflection vs. pre-reflection (or non-reflection) marks the boundary between philosophy and religion in this text. Philosophy draws religious belief into a reflective space and scrutinizes it, elucidating, confirming, or disconfirming religious claims in the light of questioning. Maybe that's one way of defining the work of the philosopher of religion.

But the story is not quite that simple, as we realize when we encounter the famous “Euthyphro problem” in the middle of the dialogue. Of course, one might be tempted to solve the dilemma by arguing through one of its "horns." Maybe there is an overarching standard for piety and goodness to which even divinity is subservient. Or maybe the things that are good _are_ only good because God/the gods like them. Divinity decides, and that's the way it is. And perhaps that's fine, as some later monotheists would argue, because God can _only_ like the Good--that's just the way God is.

It's possible that trying to sort out the dilemma, however, misunderstands what Socrates is up to here. Does Socrates want Euthyphro--or perhaps someone a bit more intrepid--to come along and solve the problem? Unlikely. Instead, the question Socrates poses--is something holy because it is beloved by the gods, or do the gods love it because it is holy--is meant to stop us in our tracks when it comes to Euthyphro's religious claims. Here it's interesting to note that Socrates himself puts a temporary stop to our "reflection" in this moment of philosophical wonder and surprise. So maybe the non- or pre-reflective moment is part of philosophy too...not just religion.

In any event, Euthyphro retreats from it and then muddles through the rest of the dialogue, never really changing his core convictions: at the end, he's just as ready to prosecute his father as he was at the beginning. But we who read this moment as genuine philosophers of religion register the surprise and perplexity, sit with it, and then press on, in pursuit of broader truths. Philosophy of religion is not _just_ about solving problems and/or policing religious claims--it takes such problems and claims as the experiential occasion for intellectual transformation.

Or so Socrates seems to be telling us!

On a totally different note, please post summaries of next week's readings below, as outlined in my recent email. And of course feel free to comment on the _Euthyphro_, if you'd like.

Philosophy of Religion -- Weeks 10 and 11

2010-05-03T10:02:00.002-04:00

One of the most vexing problems in philosophy of religion is the problem of evil. In the Western religious and philosophical context, the "problem of evil" has a specific and technical meaning: it refers to the seeming contradiction between the existence of a benevolent, all-knowing, omnipotent God and the presence of evil in the world. Defining "evil" is of course a challenge in itself, but within traditional Christian theology (e.g., according to Augustine), it had a rather broad application. It simply designated "malum," or the "bad." So anything that caused hindrances, impediments, annoyance, or suffering was considered under this definition (so this could refer equally to the common cold or fast-moving cancer). Any of these occurrences still raised the question: why would a God who intends good, knows everything that's going on, and is able to do anything let these things happen. This said, it is of course the most egregious cases of grand, seemingly unwarranted suffering that most dramatize the problem, and in the modern era in particular, it has led some to return their ticket to God's show (to appropriate Dostoevksy's metaphor).

But I wonder whether "the problem of evil" actually should be thought to refer to more universal question, one that is also active in traditions that are not monotheistic, and even among non-theists or secularists. In this sense, the broader problem of evil perhaps refers to the attempt to account for seemingly unwarranted suffering, to respond to things that have happened when every instinct tells us that they should not have. In this sense, the problem of evil is addressed in all major religious and philosophical traditions: it is a manifestation of the persistent difference between the way the world is, and the way it ought to be.

Philosophy of Religion--Weeks 8 and 9

2010-04-13T08:59:00.002-04:00

Over the past couple of weeks we have been considering the status of religious beliefs or truth-claims. What standards should we hold them to? Should we demand that they could gain the assent of any rational observer, or else they shouldn't be held? Or are we satisfied if they are simply justifiable? I.e., we may not necessarily agree or assent to someone's beliefs, but we are open to the possibility that his or her beliefs have justification? What would the foundations of such beliefs--"true" or "justified"--be? What constitutes "evidence" in this case, or is some other foundation required--or maybe (in the case of Plantinga) we need no foundation at all.

The problem gets even more complicated when we add religious experience to the mix, because if you ask many religious people why they believe the things they do, they will cite some kind of subjective experience. But how far does that go?

All of this is fascinating in its own right, but discussing these issues in a religious context also points to even bigger issues in epistemology: how do we know the stuff we think we know?!

Philosophy of Religion -- Weeks 6 and 7

2010-03-22T22:17:00.002-04:00

One of the most challenging things in reading Kant’s _Religion the Boundaries of Mere Reason_ is understanding its most important premise, which is derived from Kant's practical philosophy: that God must be posited as a “postulate” of practical reason. That is, as moral, rational beings, it is necessary for us to assume or will that God exists. Kant has different ways of arguing this point (mostly in the Second Critique). For one thing, to be moral beings, we must conceive of moral perfection or the highest good, and this idealization in turn requires that we suppose an infinite stretch of time to achieve perfection (immortality of the soul) and a being that can ascertain it (God). In other words, the fact that we posit moral perfections (let’s say an utopian world where everyone does good and is happy) requires us to think that we can attain it (ought implies can, as Kant famously said), and that someone can watch the progress, with the whole picture in view.

On a related note, Kant suggests that in the big picture, we have to imagine that ultimately, happiness and morality go together. While happiness is not the aim of moral conduct, according to Kant—and, indeed, doing the right thing often causes discomfort and unhappiness in the Kantian system—we can’t in the end imagine that this disconnect is permanent and all-pervasive. We must postulate a divine creator and law-giver who is working to bring happiness and morality together, in the perfectibility of the created order, or as symbolized through reward and punishment in an afterlife. Of course, the means-end calculation that goes with thinking about going to heaven or hell cannot be central to the Kantian system. But ends are an unavoidable element of the moral life, and Kant can’t conceive of a rational moral philosophy that leaves us thinking that the ends of human activity are all for naught.

In the end, Kant is setting the stage for an argument like Copan’s, namely that ethical ideals, perfectible virtues, or objective moral principles are impossible without positing a transcendent being that grounds them. Now, Kant’s “proof” is a little different: he is not saying that morality “proves” that God exists in the theoretical sense, as an entity (like the traditional proofs did); rather, God is something we must posit as part of our moral life, in the same way we do (and must) posit that we are in fact free. In a sense, if one does not posit God in the moral realm, the game is up: moral principles are random products of nature, and there is no point to adhering to them anyway.

Philosophy of Religion -- Week 5

2010-03-09T15:10:00.002-05:00

Investigation of the ontological proof (and its famous refutations) reveals a remarkable constellation of ideas and images: e.g., "that greater than which cannot be thought," a perfect imagined island, "existence is not a predicate," etc. What do you think of this strange proof from St. Anselm? Are his detractors (Gaunilo and Kant) right? What advantages (if any) does this proof have over the design and cosmological proofs?

Philosophy of Religion -- Week 4

2010-03-01T21:18:00.002-05:00

This week is a continuation of last week's inquiry into proofs, so the same issues are still live: what do you think about the general idea of rationally proving God's existence? Does the design proof appeal to you, and (for this week) is the cosmological proof any kind of advance in thinking? A step backwards? Equally brilliant/bankrupt? Etc.

Philosophy of Religion -- Week 3

2010-02-22T20:35:00.002-05:00

This week we turn from the broad problem of religious diversity to the relatively specific challenge of demonstrating the existence of the monotheistic God. This has been an abiding intellectual project in the West for centuries, an attempt to shore up the insights from revelation with a solid foundation in reason. And, indeed, why should it be otherwise? According to the major belief-systems of the West, God gave human beings reason, so his existence should be susceptible to rational proof--or else there's maybe something wrong with this picture...

The first proof we'll examine is the most homely, but the one most deserving of honor (according to Kant): it is the design or "physico-telelogical" proof. We wander straight from the ordering God of Genesis 1 to the insights of contemporary evolutionary science on this one (and also into the contemporary high school classroom, with the suggestion that something called "Intelligent Design" should be taught alongside evolutionary science).

Comments are invited here on the idea of proving God's existence in general: Is this a worthy project, or should it be abandoned? Is this matter susceptible to rational proof? If not, why not? And does the same analysis apply to _disproving_ God's existence?

Then, of course, the design proof itself is on the table. Does the apparent order of creation confirm anything at all about the existence of an author/creator? Does contemporary science help or hinder this form of demonstration?

Philosophy of Religion -- Week 2

2010-02-15T13:26:00.002-05:00

This week we confront the problem of religious diversity. On the formal level, the wide variety of perspectives that we tend to call "religious" presents a genuine challenge to the philosopher of religion: What exactly is this object "religion" that the philosopher is meant to scrutinize? There seems to be an overwhelmingly diverse set of particular examples to choose from. Perhaps there is a single essence of religion (the "very thing" religion, going back to Socrates' naive question: _ti esti_, what _is_ it _really_?) that we can discern. But then how do we account for the plurality of different religions, religions which contain radically different beliefs? Maybe (on the other side) religious worldviews are in fact incommensurable: each is completely different from and not translatable into the terms of the others. But then what happens to the project of "philosophy of religion"? Must it then be simply the unpacking of one view at a time, or maybe the unpacking of just one, and the assertion of its truth? That sounds like...theology.

On the related practical/ethical level, these questions has important ramifications. If religions in fact have a common basis, perhaps there is common ground for agreement, in a world that is rife with religious conflict. But perhaps that compromises the particular vision of each tradition out of existence. Many religionists claim that their way is the only way, and they even try to use reason to do it. Before discounting this sensibility as tragically intolerant, we might suggest that _truth_ in general (if it is a real truth) is intolerant...intolerant of error and falsity!

Philosophy of Religion -- Week 1

2010-02-05T14:11:00.002-05:00

The blog rolls again...this time, special welcome to the students in PHIL 322, Philosophy of Religion. We're going to tackle some great issues over the next few months, and it will be fascinating to see your thoughts reflected on this site.

While the content of the course is largely Western in orientation, at the beginning it's important to register the multiplicity of perspectives (and thus the diversity of problems) that constitute the "religion" part of "philosophy of religion." Then we'll be in a good position to think about the challenge of religious pluralism theoretically, and from there move on to some of the particular problems that go with monotheism (particularly proofs for God's existence).

So, I'd like everyone to respond below with a brief post that identifies the key issues/positions in the text that I assigned you in my recent email. If you want to respond to comments that appeared before yours, feel free.

The Nature of Evil -- Last Call

2010-01-25T20:05:00.002-05:00

Jan. term courses can feel all too short, but we have covered a lot of ground over the last month.

For the last post, I'm simply going to put the two options for the final essay in the course out there. Respond and use the blog space as a testing ground for your ideas.

Or, feel free to comment on anything that occurs to you...especially questions we haven't addressed, or issues that have been left aside.

To recall the essay questions:

1. Identify a contemporary form of evil, and outline a constructive intellectual/philosophical response to it. How would you define your concept of evil, so as to include your example within it?

2. What exactly is the philosophical problem of evil facing us today? Or is there such a thing anymore? Should we perhaps jettison the concept “evil” in favor of some other terminology or form of explanation?

Nature of Evil -- Week 3

2010-01-18T16:37:00.002-05:00

I have seen the Frontline documentary _Ghosts of Rwanda_ many times now, but it never ceases to affect me. The whole thing is remarkable, but each time I watch it, there are certain moments that stand out. One of them is a moment in the interview with Romeo Dallaire, the U.N. general in charge of the peacekeeping force. He describes his meeting with leaders of the Interahamwe, the Hutu militia that did much of the killing, and notices, as they're shaking hands, that these same hands still have blood spots on them. Dallaire reports that these men were no longer human: they were bestial, or demonic--something that was not human, that was simply evil, something that needed to be destroyed. He wonders to this day whether he should have simply taken out his pistol and shot them, rather than negotiating. I wonder too.

Another unfortunate feature of our world (along with genocide) is terrorism. The philosopher always starts with the most basic, sometimes the most naive question, and in the present context, here it is: is terrorism in fact "evil"?

The Nature of Evil -- Week 2 Addendum

2010-01-13T17:27:00.003-05:00

Last night a major earthquake struck Haiti, almost completely destroying its capital city, Port au Prince. Nobody knows how many victims have already died, and it's hard to think about how many are trapped underneath rubble, with no prospect of help reaching them. But it's entirely possible that the numbers of those lost will reach at least 100,000.

Obviously this event is immediately relevant to the issues we have been considering: this is perhaps yet another instance of "natural evil," one that challenges monotheists to come up with an answer/response/theodicy. How much exactly do the Haitians have to go through before the lesson is learned, the test passed, the balance established, the general laws fulfilled? Going back to Rousseau, it also insists that we consider the human role in such disasters. That a place is so impoverished and its buildings so badly constructed suggests that what we call natural evil is largely a species of moral evil.

Feel free to comment however you see fit...

Nature of Evil -- Week 2

2010-01-11T15:18:00.002-05:00

Gallows humor is one of the ways that human beings have consistently stood up to the most miserable instances of suffering. Turning this week to the Holocaust, it's hard to make jokes. But in fact many jokes came out of the ghettoes and the camps, as victims tried to fend off the brutality with humor. I recall one such example: A Nazi officer rounds up a group of Jews in the ghetto, and it's clear that he intends to kill them. One of the men cries out, "Please, please, don't shoot me. Have pity!" The Nazi officer says, "Fine. But I will ask you a question, and you have to answer corretly, and if you do, you will be allowed to live. One of my eyes is artificial--it is a glass eye--but it was made by one of the finest craftsmen in Berlin. No one can even tell which one it is. If you can tell, you will not be shot." The Jewish man looked closely at the Nazi and said, "It's the left one." The Nazi was amazed and said, "You are correct! But how did you know?" And the Jewish man said, "That one almost looked human."

The anecdote leads to some interesting thoughts. How can we joke about such things? How could people in those circumstances make up jokes? Perhaps humor is an innately _human_ capacity; it helps us maintain our humanity, even in the darkest circumstances. We are also led to think about the perpetrator of such crimes: are they inherently inhuman--monstrous even--as the man in the story suggests? Or is Arendt right: perpetrators of genocide are far from monstrous; they are instead all too human--banal, thoughtless, clownish. What is the cause behind events like the Holocaust or the Rwandan genocide? What in human nature or in society drives them? And how should we respond? What if we followed Wiesel's example, at least as he appears at the end of _Night_: would we be left with anything to hold on to?

Nature of Evil -- January 2010 -- Week 1

2010-01-04T17:51:00.002-05:00

This January this blog takes another swing at the the nature of evil and attempts to get some answers, in conjunction with a class full of bright students at MMC. When and where should we use this term, if ever? What are some of the different ways evil has been conceptualized, by philosophers, and within public/political/popular discourse?

Let's start this week with another fundamental question, one that's initiated by the Book of Job and carries through the philosophical/religious tradition in the West, all the way up to the present day: Is the presence of grievous suffering in the world ("seemingly unwarranted suffering," as I like to call it) compatible with belief in a monotheistic God?

Faith and Doubt -- Last Call

2009-12-14T09:44:00.003-05:00

Our inquiry into the status of religious belief has very much arrived in the present, with our reflections on 9/11 and its aftermath, and discussion of the book by Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion. We find ourselves in a strange time: the public discourse about religion is often radically polarized, and this discourse certainly manifests a deeply divided culture. On one side we have the "New Atheists," who are churning out bestsellers. On the other, there is the massive "faith-based" community (as opposed to "reality-based," an infamous distinction that emerged from the Bush White House), who couldn't be more diametrically opposed. And then there is a significant, confused in-between: permanent and temporary agnostics, present day ambivalentists, and seekers picking and choosing what they need to get by from religion and elsewhere. It's a strange time.

This state of affairs was the matrix for the theme, Faith and Doubt. And it led me to pose the guiding questions of this course, which I'll pose again, for anyone to comment on: Does religious belief remain a valid, well founded, and perhaps necessary aspect of human experience? Or have the events of the last century (or the last decade) shattered its possibility beyond repair?

Looking back at the comments from this semester, there have already been so many eloquent attempts to address these questions, in specific contexts, on this blog. Now feel free to step back and say what you will...

Week 10 (or so)

2009-12-02T11:07:00.002-05:00

Marjane Satrapi's book Persepolis is quite disarming; perhaps that's the case for any text that at first glance resembles a comic book. But of course the graphic novel has become a serious genre, and in this case, what starts as an illustrated childhood memoir quickly tranforms into a very profound text indeed. There is of course the frame of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the miserable Iran-Iraq War in the backdrop; there's the constant fear for the heroine and her family, whose left-leaning, Western tendencies always put them at risk. There's a lot to be gained here, lessons about what it's like to live through these kinds of momentous events.

But then there's the story of Marji at the center, and her childhood drama. I'm particularly interested in her vacillations between faith and doubt before the revolution, and as it unfolds. Early on, she strikes up an allegience to/alliance with God, but then somehow absorbs some Marx and becomes a revolutionary. Back and forth she goes. I wonder: how seriously should we take the faith of a child (think back to Wiesel, Freud, etc.)? Is it inherently naive, or is there something authentic about it?

I also have to wonder: with thoughts of God and revolution floating around in her head, why didn't the heroine of this story latch onto the cultural transformation that occurred (instead, she resists it)? Is this adolescent rebellion?

Finally (and I suspect that this is related to the theme of a child's view of the world, which is running through this post), what does Satrapi's style of illustration convey?

Weeks 8 and 9

2009-11-17T14:45:00.003-05:00

Time is fleeting, and I want to open up some space for discussing the new issues we have been investigating, so I'll make it brief. In light of the challenges posed by Carol Christ and Mary Daly, do you think that the foundations of Judaism and Christianity are inherently biased against women? Or perhaps even misogynist? Or do Christ and Daly misunderstand something essential about God and the scriptures? Do women need "the goddess"? A different concept of God? A return to tradition?

Faith and Doubt -- Weeks 6 and 7

2009-10-29T12:01:00.003-04:00

The Autobiography of Malcolm X gives us a portrait of a profoundly influential figure who went through a whole series of transformations. It's safe to say, however, that two events in particular punctuated the life of this remarkable and controversial man: his prison conversion and his trip to Mecca. This pivotal moments raise many questions about the nature of religious belief and experience--and the story as a whole reminds us about the often intimate connection between religion, race/racism, and politics.

To reassert our big question: It seems that Malcolm X's religious faith was shattered--almost from the beginning--by his personal experience and the racist environment he grew up in. But like C.S. Lewis, he eventually found something he could believe in. What exactly is the connection between religion and racism in this story?

This text also tells us a lot about the nature of religious experience (conversion in particular), and it also reveals something more generally about the process we undergo when our fundamental beliefs about the world change. What are the most important forces behind these kinds of shifts? What anticipates them? And what role does after-the-fact interpretation play? Does this form of analysis diminish or undermine the religious content of conversions like the ones that Malcolm X undergoes? I.e., does it raise doubts about the truth or reality of religious conversions?

Faith and Doubt -- Weeks 4 and 5

2009-10-16T13:07:00.003-04:00

Faith and Doubt--Weeks 4 and 5

2009-10-13T15:13:00.002-04:00

Since my last post we have taken up a profound case study in our reflections on the modern struggle between faith and doubt: the experience of anti-Semitism in Europe, leading up to the Holocaust. Elie Wiesel's Night dramatizes the issues before us.

In reflecting on the big historical picture, we have to think carefully about the link that has often been forged between religion and oppression. This will be a running theme in coming weeks as we also study Malcolm X and feminist criticism. There is no doubt that religion has been a force for good, but for many, its tendency towards hierarchy, conservatism, and even violence has been a significant instigator of doubt--especially in the modern period. We'll have to look into this. Maybe it's all too easy to cherry-pick the history of religion for its many crimes and foibles, but to what extent can we pin these troubling episodes on religion "itself"? We're dealing with a case in point right now: to what extent was/is anti-Semitism essential to the Christian message?

In discussing Night we will obviously want to pay close attention to the development/devolution of Wiesel's religious consciousness, as he recounts his experience in the text. As things progressively get worse, and especially as his comrades become radically dehumanized by the Nazis, Wiesel's questioning becomes more and more radical. Now one can argue that this questioning fits into the unique combination of faith and doubt that has often characterized Jewish religiosity (cf. Job's protest, for example), but we have to wonder: does Wiesel really have any faith left by the end of this ordeal? And in what?

Faith and Doubt -- Week 3

2009-09-29T16:00:00.002-04:00

The discussion about C.S. Lewis and Freud continues this week, so let me merely highlight some of the issues that have come up, to keep the ball rolling.

First, we’re entering the fascinating but sometimes hazy territory between someone’s psychology/background and their stated commitments. This territory is worth exploring. As I have suggested, abstract, conceptual arguments in the philosophy of religion (whether God’s existence can be proved, why God allows unwarranted suffering, etc.) have their origins in human experience. And Freud himself teaches us to look behind the views that people outwardly and publicly propound—and see what’s really going on. But how far should this scrutiny go? Are everyone’s arguments in some sense tainted by their own background or experience, or is it possible for the arguments to rise above their source? In your opinion, is that something that is possible for C.S. Lewis and Freud—or one and not the other?

Second, there have been some interesting comments about the nature of tolerance—and how tolerant we should be of tolerance. Perhaps C.S. Lewis is more appealing, in a way, because he doesn’t condemn others: he writes about his experience and invites others to explore the path to God. Meanwhile, Freud charges that the religious (along with most of humanity) are in fact living under a neurotic illusion. That’s not very nice. Indeed, tolerance is a tricky thing, and my philosopher’s side is not always very tolerant of it. We might want to say, “Whatever people believe is cool, as long as it doesn’t affect me.” But then I might invoke a classic argument in the philosophy of religion: beliefs always end up having some kind of affect. Religious devotees (and Freudians) vote, for example. And, indeed, I like to argue that if someone else believes that water can be transmuted into wine, or that human beings can be raised from the dead, and so on, then that person is making a claim on your world: namely, that such things are possible. Even if someone is generally keeping those beliefs to him or herself, the claim is still being made—so we are called upon to scrutinize it.

Just one more thing: a vital point about the argument from morality. This argument, which has made by many, including C.S. Lewis, has two vital steps: first, that there is a universal moral standard, and second, that the existence of this moral standard suggests that God exists. Recalling these two steps will help you clarify your thinking about this claim.

Ok…that’s all for now! Keep commenting.

2009-09-18T19:50:00.003-04:00

Faith and Doubt -- Week 2

2009-09-18T19:36:00.002-04:00

Some fantastic comments so far, both about the memory of 9/11, and the possible interconnectedness of faith and doubt.

This week we're reading the Nicholi book, _The Question of God_, so I'll keep it simple: between Sigmund Freud and C.S. Lewis, with whom do you find yourself agreeing more? And why, exactly? (That second question is the much more difficult one, of course.)

Faith and Doubt -- Week 1

2009-09-11T12:16:00.002-04:00

Greetings to all--and a special welcome to students enrolled in RS 110 at Marymount Manhattan College, a course called Faith and Doubt.

It seems fitting to start a discussion about the status of religious belief on September 11. For many, the events of eight years ago today utterly and in some cases irreparably shattered their faith. Others returned to religion or found their faith strengthened in the face of inexplicable tragedy. The excellent documentary "Faith and Doubt at Ground Zero" encapsulates this dichotomy with a moving 9/11 legend: As the situation grew impossible on the upper floors and people started jumping from the building, it is reported that two people, probably two strangers, were seen grasping hands and jumping together. The question: Were they seeking solidarity with each other, because they knew at that moment that they were utterly alone--no God, no heaven, no meaning? Or were those clasped hands a symbol of abiding faith in something beyond them--almost like hands clasped in prayer?

Big themes, big ideas. Difficult ones. Let me leave this with some more prosaic questions for possible discussion: Who would you identify as the great doubters in history? And who were the most faithful? Are faith and doubt stark opposites, two radically different operations in human consciousness? Or is there some connection or relationship between them?

To Will One Thing...Vacation

2009-07-06T10:53:00.002-04:00

To Will One Thing will be off for a few weeks...have a happy July!

(By the way, inquiring minds want to know: can anyone identify what's pictured in the photo above? The first one to guess correctly gets a free guest post on the front page. Wow, what a prize!)

Nature of Evil Roundup

2009-06-30T16:08:00.004-04:00

It’s gratifying to see so many thoughtful comments on the nature of evil. Let me pull together a selection of some of the most potent ideas, as a way of looking back—and also as a way of keeping the conversation going. The class might be over, but the blog discussion lives on!

At the top, I think that a useful working definition of moral evil has arisen from these deliberations. Moral evil occurs when

a) a massive level of harm is done (mass death), and/or harm is particularly brutal (torture, abuse, etc.)

b) the perpetrators have intent to create this harm

c) and the victims are not themselves particularly culpable, or, worse, they are vulnerable/innocent.

Other scattered insights:

We have recognized something central in the discussion of “natural evil,” whether one comes at it as a theist or not: in our day and age, it’s extremely difficult to separate “natural evil” from “moral evil,” because a) we have a massive impact on our environment and b) a lot of the suffering associated with natural disasters is the product of human (in)activity (cf. building unsound structures in Lisbon, not responding to Katrina). And from the other side, what used to be considered purely "moral" has become "natural": brain defects, chemical imbalances, etc. lead to horrible acts.

There has been a fascinating discussion of the classic “free will defense” of God in light of the presence of suffering in the world. Giving the world’s (and our) imperfections, it is legitimate to distinguish, as Leibniz seems to, God’s role in getting things started (setting the rules) and his will to bring things to completion (ultimate, providential harmony?)—which will surely happen, eventually? In the meantime, everything is in process, on its way. The whole schmear is “perfect,” maybe…but while it’s unfolding, from our limited perspective, it sure doesn’t seem so! And, as many have noted, this kind of thinking seems to deny the very real harms we call “evil” by explaining them away…

In the end, the discussion of children—the abuse and punishment inflicted on them—became an important issue. It’s entirely relevant because as a number of folks have argued, while “evil” remains a diffuse, problematic term, it seems like a no-brainer to apply it to cruelty inflicted on children (like in Dostoevsky). Maybe this is an example of thinking about evil as a kind of protest against a world where things often just don’t seem right—and as exercise (a hardcore workout) for our moral capacity. There’s a big difference between a little boy torn apart by dogs and a child who receives a slap from his parent—but thinking about the extreme case maybe makes us a bit more morally sensitive to “lesser evils,” and it makes us wonder about devising more constructive responses to unruly children (or just unruly people in general) that aren’t _any_ kind of evil at all.

The Nature of Evil -- Week 5

2009-06-22T12:26:00.003-04:00

The comments and discussion in response to traditional forms of theodicy have been excellent, so I will limit this post to some questions that are simply designed to keep the conversation going...

First, is "natural evil" (as examined by figures like Pope, Voltaire, and Rousseau) simply an old-fashioned idea, now that science has given us such improved knowledge about things like earthquakes, tsunamis, disease, etc.? In other words, how can a purely natural phenomenon be "evil"?

Second, it's important to return to a basic question: Does the presence of seemingly unwarranted suffering in the world necessarily lead to agnosticism about the existence of God? To atheism? (I.e., did Sextus Empiricus have it right? What about Ivan in The Brothers Karamazov?) Thinking about this issue from another angle: is so-called "evil" only a "problem" (as in, some kind of intellectual/existential scandal that urgently needs to get sorted out) if one believes in God?

Nature of Evil -- Week 4

2009-06-14T15:47:00.003-04:00

After wading into the morass of contemporary evil, it’s a good idea to step back a bit and reach into the philosophical tradition to see what intellectual resources it has to offer us in contending with a very difficult historical moment. In Western thought, this means confronting the classic “problem of evil,” which begins with a theistic premise: if God exists, and God is well intentioned, all powerful, and all knowing, then how can “evil” (let’s say, extreme, seemingly unwarranted suffering) exist? Why doesn’t God do something about it? Is he not so well intentioned, not so interested, limited in his reach, or at times ignorant about what’s going on? None of those options seem plausible for a mainstream adherent of Western monotheism. But something has to give: “evil,” God’s qualities, or maybe even (some would argue) God’s existence itself.

To get the ball rolling on this front, let me offer two quotations that have done the rounds in philosophy of religion circles, both (coincidentally) from 19th century French literary types. First, “The greatest trick that the devil ever played was convincing the world he doesn’t exist.” This is Baudelaire, and many will recognize this statement from the fabulous film, The Usual Suspects. When we inspect traditional attempts to account for evil in the world, what we often find is the suggestion that what we think is evil really isn’t; in fact, evil doesn’t really exist. Perhaps this is an even greater evil, the greatest trick that evil can play, because it leads us to suggest that terrible occurrences (genocide, tsunami, abuse, etc.) are actually part of some greater plan…

The other quotation comes from Stendhal. In the face of all the suffering in the world, “God’s only excuse is that he doesn’t exist.” Kind of speaks for itself…

Nature of Evil: Week 3

2009-06-07T14:53:00.003-04:00

Just to follow up on my earlier comment about the film, In the Valley of Elah (and warning: I’m going to spoil the ending). In this movie, Tommy Lee Jones’ son, who has just returned from a tour of duty in Iraq, goes missing and is eventually found murdered (brutally: the kid is stabbed, dismembered, and then burned…almost a conscious emulation of a medieval torture session). The Jones character investigates and finds out some unsavory things about both his son and his fellow soldiers. For one thing, he finds out where his son got the nickname “Doc”: this fine young soldier developed the propensity to torture wounded Iraqis by probing their wounds and saying, “Does this hurt?” And ultimately Jones finds out that it was his son’s brothers-in-arms who have killed him…for no good reason: they have simply become so desensitized that his murder—even of their buddy—makes little to no impression.

In the middle of the film, Jones tells the story of the biblical David to a little boy (the son of the lead civilian detective on the case, played by Charlize Theron). It’s a great story to tell a scared, fatherless little boy: the young David masters his fear, faces up to the giant, evil Goliath in the valley of Elah, and slays him with his sling (see 1 Samuel 17). But the subtext to this biblical allusion is clear (Paul Haggis, the writer and director, puts it front and center in the title of the film): think about what happens to David after this noble victory. David of course becomes a violent soldier-king; he kills tens of thousands, betrays Uriah and steals his wife (Bathsheba), is overthrown, returns and kills more people, pridefully counts his people and is punished (actually, the people are punished), and dies with blood on his hands and anger in his heart. So there it is: we can send our well intentioned young men and women out to fight “evil,” but in fighting it, what is done to them?

On a somewhat different note, our attention is drawn this week to the question of “dialogue” with evil, in conjunction with the Dialogue In/As Action conference this weekend (see http://www.networkforpeace.com/). So the question is simply: Is dialogue with evil possible? Or is it part of the nature of “evil” not to be susceptible to dialogue? Or if we’re in reasonable dialogue or negotiation with someone, perhaps they are not in fact “evil”? And what kind of dialogue should we (can we) be talking about here: our figurative, intellectual dialogue with “evil” phenomena? Or actual negotiation with perpetrators?

Examples to consider: Schindler negotiating with Amon Goeth, the commandment of Plazsow labor camp; interviewing Eichmann; Romeo Dallaire’s decision to negotiate with the Interahamwe during the Rwandan genocide; Osama bin Laden’s demands/points of negotiation in his letter to the American people. Etc.

Hanging Out on 9/11

2009-06-02T22:52:00.004-04:00

The Nature of Evil: Week 2

2009-06-01T13:17:00.003-04:00

We’ve had some fine comments so far on the basic question: just what is evil? Here are some highlights:

From class discussion: Evil can be perhaps be defined by scale/quality of and intention behind wrong-doing. I.e., actions on a massive scale (like genocide) and/or with a particularly vicious quality (torture, abuse) _and_ an expressly malicious intent (evil intended, in some sense, for its own sake) can be called evil.

Evil is simply the opposite of good and exists in a homeostatic/balanced relationship with good.

Evil is apathy.

Evil is a “singularity,” not a balance/imbalance with good.

Evil is the “inexcusable.”

Evil as a sickness.

Evil is hard to define, but we have to try…otherwise we go down a slippery slope: we contibute to losing hold of language itself.

A couple of quick comments of my own, to continue to push the conversation along.
We had a good discussion of Elie Wiesel’s Night last week. Though we could have spent a very long time working through this provocative text, we were successful, I think, in nailing down two significant ways that the book laments the evil perpetrated on the victims of the Holocaust: it decries their dehumanization and their loss of “faith” (just to put it simply). Indeed, the book gives us a terrifying portrayal of the way in which human nature degenerates, until in the end sons have turned against fathers…and Wiesel himself contemplates this horrible option. At the same time, the world’s moral/spiritual coherence is utterly shattered for Wiesel and his fellow victims. “Everything is permitted,” God hangs from the gallows, and Hitler is the only one who keeps his promises (playing on the foundational Jewish conceptualization of “covenant,” berith). Does Wiesel maintain some kind of faith, perhaps in the classic style of Job or Jacob (the wrestler), protesting and arguing against God? Or has he lost everything…except faith in one thing: the simple fact of survival?

On another note, we’ll be thinking more about the complex triad of perpetrator/victim/observer this week as we move into reflecting on 9/11 and its aftermath. I have recently watched two excellent films that get us thinking about the evil after the evil: how the victim can easily become the perpetrator. In Taxi to the Dark Side, a documentary about the road the U.S. went down after 9/11, leading to the abuses at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo. The documentary shows us how easy it was, with the tacit approval of the higher-ups, for average, upstanding American soldiers to become sadists. It also does a brilliant job of blowing apart the “ticking bomb” mythology, the hypothetical that was reinforced week after week on the Fox show 24 within which a terrorist is held in custody, and he knows where and when a catastrophic bomb blast will take place…and it’s imminent. Torture this person? Of course! So goes the corrosive logic of this extreme case…

The other film is In the Valley of Elah…but time is fleeting right now…so another entry will be forthcoming.

Nature of Evil: Week 1

2009-05-26T12:13:00.003-04:00

A simple question: in your opinion, what is evil? Offer a working definition, or present examples of phenomena that are, to your mind, worthy of this title.